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The Hybrid Phenomenon
Over the past 20 years innovation has become the 
“Holy Grail in management – an elusive goal to be 
pursued continuously” (Lee, Edmonson, Thomke 
& Worline, 2004: 310). Over the same time period, 
hybrid organizational forms have increasingly be-
come the norm in large parts of the business land-
scape, and have been the topic of recent significant 
theoretical development (Makadok & Coff, 200). 
Hybrids blend traditional organizational elements 
with market-like elements. They vary greatly, from 
traditional-looking organizations that selectively 
implement market-based pay mechanisms inside 
the firm to more radical hybrids such as Google 
and W. L. Gore (owners of the Gore-Tex brand, 
among other businesses), which are highly decen-
tralized and networked. Much hybridization has 
involved corporations significantly reorganizing 
activities around smaller organizational building 
blocks, teams, decentralized decision making and 
empowered work practices. Such changes suggest 
that classical hierarchical forms of organizing have 
evolved by being steadily infused with elements of 
market-like behaviors. These changes may reflect 
the efficient adaptation of organizational forms to 
contemporary competitive demands, which in-
cludes the rapid adoption and production of 
innovations.
Our approach
In this paper we operationalize contemporary theo-
retical development relating to hybrid organizations 
(Makadok & Coff, 200) in order to explore the 
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Abstract
The past 20 years has seen the rapid rise of hybrid organizations that blend traditional organiza-
tional elements with market-like elements. Over the same time period, there has also been a global 
explosion in innovation. In this paper we examine the relationship between elements of hybrid 
organization forms and innovation outcomes. We use meta-analysis to summarize data on 16,605 
firms across industries and geographies. Our results show that robust relationships exist between 
innovation and three key elements of hybrid organizations – autonomy, rewards and ownership. 
Further analyses reveal that organizational support provides a critical link between innovation 
and the hybrid organizational levers. 
Keywords: innovation, governance, hybrid, support, autonomy
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possibility that the hybridization of organizations is 
associated with increases in the innovativeness of 
those organizations. Our goal is to use readily avail-
able empirical data to analyze this connection be-
tween hybrid organizations and innovation. To do 
this we use a meta-analytic approach, which enables 
us to statistically aggregate data from a wide range 
of prior studies in order to ascertain whether the 
key features of hybrid organizations are systemati-
cally related to differences in innovation among or-
ganizations. While other fields of science, such as 
psychology and medicine, pioneered the use of 
meta-analysis, this approach has recently been 
strongly advocated in management research under 
the title of “evidence-based management” and has 
begun to see widespread use in a number of top 
journals. However, no study has yet examined the 
relationship between hybrids and innovation, de-
spite the obvious importance of both topics to 
managers working at the top of global 
corporations.
Takeaways
This study extends current thinking on the relation-
ship between organizational form and innovation 
in two ways. First, our results indicate that robust 
relationships exist between three key elements of 
hybrids and innovation. For the organizational de-
sign elements of autonomy and rewards, a move in 
a more market-like direction is associated with a 
statistically significant increase in innovative out-
put. Ownership displays a similar pro-market pat-
tern, with external ownership being positively re-
lated to innovative output, while internal ownership 
is negatively related to innovative output. These 
findings are important because the mandate to in-
novate raises many questions about the best ways to 
organize for innovative tasks. In spite of – or be-
cause of – the considerable body of empirical stud-
ies that examine relationships between particular 
organizational factors and innovation, extant re-
search often offers contradictory and confusing re-
sults, stemming from the use of different models 
and samples, and sometimes from the age of these 
studies (which may make them less relevant to 
contemporary decisions). Our meta-analytic meth-
odology enabled us to simultaneously analyze the 
effects on innovation of all three elements of hy-
brids across a vast sample of organizations of all 
types, adjusting for factors such as the sample sizes 
in individual studies and presenting a coherent pic-
ture of the direction and relative strength of ele-
ments of hybrids on innovation outcomes.
Second, we identified the role of two modera-
tors of the hybrids-innovation relationship: organi-
zation size and organizational support for innova-
tion. This generates a more comprehensive 
framework for understanding the process by which 
hybrid elements enable innovation outcomes, by 
highlighting how the hybrid elements are sensitive 
to situational factors. Our statistical analysis sug-
gests that support for innovation is highly signifi-
cant as a moderator of both autonomy and rewards 
(the two variables for which we were able to collect 
data). Additionally, we found that autonomy and 
rewards more strongly connect with innovation in 
large firms than in small firms.
Together, these contributions bring an integra-
tive perspective to the hybrids-innovation relation-
ship and suggest useful alternatives to managers 
seeking to make their organizations more innova-
tive in their products, services, processes and 
practices.
Organization
In the next section of the paper, we identify the 
three key elements of hybrids from the academic 
literature, plus support for innovation, and our 
measures of innovativeness. The third section 
briefly describes the process we used to amass data 
from 20 years of academic research studies, and the 
methods we used to analyze it. The fourth section is 
to presents the results of the analysis. Finally, we 
close with a discussion of the implications of our 
findings for top managers, as well as for academics 
interested in research on hybrids and innovation.
SCope oF Study
While a number of different trends have likely in-
fluenced the emergence of hybrids (e.g. information 
technology), the theoretical explanation for why 
these trends result in hybridization is focused on 
three organizational governance mechanisms: re-
wards, ownership and autonomy (Makadok & Coff, 
200). Each of these mechanisms changes the in-
centive structure for action in organizations by al-
locating three kinds of residual incomes:
• Autonomy involves residual rights of control 
over an agent’s actions. Less autonomy means 
more bureaucratic control over the actions 
of organizational members and less individ-
ual empowerment. 
• Rewards involve residual claims on the value 
of current outputs. When allocated to cur-
rent members of an organization, they in-
centivize increases in production efforts.
• Ownership involves residual claims on the 
terminal value of the firm’s assets, which en-
courages owners to maintain and increase 
the value of these assets.
These three basic variables represent three basic, 
independent levers for influencing the innovative 
potential of organizations, as follows.
autonomy
The relationship between work autonomy and in-
novation has been recognized and variously de-
scribed and measured in several different research 
literatures for half a century. For example, one origi-
nal study (Burns & Stalker, 161) described low 
centralization (hence high autonomy) as one of the 
characteristics of organic organizations, which are 
designed for creativity and innovation. In these or-
ganizations, decision-making authority is typically 
dispersed rather than being concentrated in the 
hands of a few managers. Studies typically measure 
“…the degree of… participation in decision mak-
ing or… the degree of freedom organizational 
members have to make their own decisions.” 
(Damanpour, 11: 58). This definition highlights 
both a role for employees in determining how they 
do their job and the inclusion of their voice in deci-
sions that affect them, themes that have been fur-
ther developed in research on employee 
empowerment. 
Two rationales are most commonly used to ex-
plain the impact of autonomy on innovation. First, 
perceived control is an important motivational 
variable in human behavior because self-determi-
nation increases employees’ intrinsic motivation, 
which improves performance and creativity 
(Amabile, Conti, Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 16; 
Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1). Second, innovative 
activity depends on how well an organization lever-
ages the stock of individual knowledge dispersed 
within it. Workplace autonomy influences employ-
ees’ ability to self-organize and network with others 
in order to obtain and utilize the dispersed local, 
tacit, embedded and sticky information and knowl-
edge they need to discover and solve problems, 
which also increases innovation.
In gathering data for our meta-analysis, we ar-
ticulated autonomy as individual autonomy or 
workplace discretion within the organization. And 
though potential differences exist in the exact defi-
nition of the ideas of autonomy and workplace dis-
cretion (Patterson et al., 2005; Shalley, Gilson, & 
Blum, 2000; Griffin, Patterson, & West, 2001; Holt, 
Rutherford, & Clohessy, 2007), we combine the two 
for the purposes of our investigation as both reflect 
the freedom of the individual to spend resources, 
engage in activities (DiLiello & Houghton, 2008) 
and determine work relationships (Vera & Crossan, 
2005). We also include rational economic autono-
mous discretionary acts (Chandy & Tellis, 18; 
Sadler-Smith, El-Kot, & Leat, 2003) as they reflect 
individual latitude. As appropriate, we reverse 
coded variables that seem opposed to autonomy 
such as power distance (Lam, Schaubroeck, & 
Aryee, 2002), centralization (Jansen, Van Den 
Bosch, & Volberda, 2006) and formalization 
(Nohria & Gulati, 16).
Rewards 
The creation of innovations requires tasks that are 
primarily cognitive and are thus difficult to directly 
observe and control. As a result, firms attempt to 
craft incentive mechanisms that indirectly control 
innovative effort by inducing employees to engage 
in innovative behaviors (Zenger & Lazzarini, 2004). 
These mechanisms can manifest in performance-
contingent compensation delivered in several dif-
ferent forms, including one-off cash payments, 
year-end performance bonuses, favorable annual 
salary raises and promotion opportunities. These 
rewards may be tied to either innovation inputs 
(behaviors) or outputs (results). 
Rewards are important inducements for inno-
vation for two reasons. First, higher levels of rewards 
encourage higher levels of effort, since employees 
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stand to capture some portion of their increased 
performance through the incentive mechanism. 
Therefore it is likely that explicit rewards for inno-
vation will increase innovative outputs. Second, 
more able employees will prefer to work at firms 
that offer more intense incentives because they will 
be better rewarded at such firms, compared with 
less talented employees who will prefer firms that 
offer less intense incentives, ceteris paribus (Zenger, 
12). As firms that use explicit rewards for inno-
vation are likely to create a self-selection effect and 
encourage greater individual effort, this should be 
reflected in measures of the firm’s innovative out-
put. However, psychologists studying creativity in 
the workplace have at various times cautioned 
against the potentially negative effects of incentives 
for creative work (Amabile et al., 16; Deci et al., 
1; Eisenberger, 12), suggesting contingency 
in the connection between rewards and creativity 
and the need to build more sophisticated models 
that account for possible intervening variables.
Rewards come in many forms, and for the pur-
poses of this investigation, we included strong in-
centives such as salary (Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 
2002), short-term pay and long-term pay (e.g., 
Yanadori & Marler, 2006) and contingent pay 
(Shipton , West, Dawson, Birdi, & Patterson, 2006), 
alongside weaker incentives such as recognition 
(DiLiello & Houghton, 2008), competitive rewards 
(Ferrin & Dirks, 2003) and a system to reward em-
ployees for progress on product or process innova-
tions that take a long time to reach market 
(Barringer & Bluedorn, 1). An additional attri-
bute we applied to formal incentives was whether 
the evaluation criteria were quantitative or 
tangible.
Ownership
Interest in the relationship between ownership and 
innovation can be traced at least to the 180s (Hill 
& Snell, 188), and it blossomed in the 10s as one 
aspect of the broader research agenda of agency 
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 176). Ownership pro-
vides a different incentive structure than rewards or 
autonomy. A key observation is that the interests of 
stockholders (principals) and managers (agents) 
diverge with regard to the management of firms. 
For external stockholders, innovation is a high 
risk/high return strategy that can be managed by 
diversifying equity holdings across many firms. By 
contrast, owners managing one firm have less ability 
to diversify their risks. Therefore they bear the high 
risk of failing in the pursuit of innovation in their 
individual firm without the compensating benefit 
of upside returns via a portfolio of stockholdings in 
other innovative firms. Since managers are subject 
to this vulnerability, one might predict that they 
might avoid risk by reducing their commitments 
to, and emphasis on, innovation. Given the influ-
ence of a firm’s leadership and top management 
team on the processes in organizations, it is reason-
able to expect that these managerial factors will 
translate into significant differences in an organiza-
tion’s propensity to produce and adopt innovations. 
Thus, owners’ ability to assert their goals depends 
on the extent to which they can effectively control a 
firm’s management. Stock concentration (Demsetz 
& Lehn, 185), managerial stock holdings (Demsetz, 
183) and the ratio of insiders to outsiders on firm 
boards (Fama & Jensen, 183) are the primary fac-
tors influencing whose agenda is adopted – that of 
the owners or that of the managers. Stockholders 
who own even a relatively small block of stock have 
significant incentive to monitor and lobby senior 
management to prioritize innovation in the firm’s 
strategy; block holdings should therefore be related 
to more innovative firms. Where management 
holds substantial stockholdings, it is expected that 
internal ownership will be related to lower innova-
tion. With regard to board composition, it is ex-
pected that external board members are more likely 
than internal members to represent the interests 
and agenda of owners. 
We identified work on the ownership of firm 
stock or equity and divided our findings into two 
groups: external and internal ownership. We opera-
tionalized external ownership as outside directors 
(Deutsch, 2007), institutional ownership (Baysinger, 
Kosnik, & Turk 11; Zahra, 16), major corpo-
rate stockholders (Makri, Lane, & Gomez-Mejia, 
2006) and blockholders (Sanders & Carpenter, 
18), and pressure-resistant ownership (Kochhar 
& David, 16). With internal ownership, we in-
cluded the value and percentage of equity owned by 
insiders and directors (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & 
Grossman, 2002), individual ownership concentra-
tion (Baysinger et al., 11), CEO and executive 
ownership (Zahra, 16; Hansen & Hill, 11), as 
well as individual owner control (Balkin, Markman, 
& Gomez-Mejia, 2000).
Support for Innovation
In addition to the three hybrid elements described 
above, we identified a fourth variable – support for 
innovation – as an important factor we hypothe-
sized to influence how the hybrid elements impact 
innovativeness. Support for innovation is “the ex-
pectation, approval and practical support of at-
tempts to introduce new and improved ways of 
doing things in the work environment” (West, 
10). Jung, Chow, and Wu (2003) measured sup-
port for innovation using a scale originally devel-
oped by Siegel and Kaemmerer (178) and later 
modified by Scott and Bruce (14). Support for 
innovation is beneficial because innovative work is 
often demanding and stressful, thus individuals se-
lectively engage in innovative efforts depending on 
how much social support and encouragement is 
available for them. Organizational support operates 
as encouragement for efforts related to engaging in 
innovation such as “support for innovation” (Bain, 
Mann, & Pirola-Merlo, 2001; Clegg, Unsworth, 
Epitropaki, & Parker, 2002; Jung et al., 2003; Krause, 
2004; Scott & Bruce, 14; West & Anderson, 16), 
as well as related constructs – always within the or-
ganization and in the context of innovation – of or-
ganizational and management support (Hurley & 
Hult, 18; Lee & Peccei, 2007; Patterson et al., 
2005; Shalley, Gilson & Blum, 200; West & 
Anderson, 16; Zhou & George, 2001), collabora-
tion (Hurley & Hult, 18) and product champions 
(Chandy & Tellis, 18; Day, 14). But organiza-
tional support can also offer a safety net. Innovation 
is an uncertain activity, subject to unpredictable re-
sults as well as outright failure. And the willingness 
of the organization to provide psychological safety 
(Baer & Frese, 2003; Edmonson, 1; Nilniyom, 
2007) in those situations, or to work to reframe 
failure as learning (Edmondson, 1; Shipton, Fay, 
West, Patterson, & Birdi, 2005; Shipton et al., 2006) 
also constitute support for innovation in our opera-
tionalization of the concept.
Innovation
Innovation was assessed using measures that range 
from personal behaviors, such as innovative work 
behavior (Van der Vegt & Janssen, 2003) and cre-
ativity (Nilniyom, 2007), to some of the observable 
outcomes of that behavior. Outcomes include in-
novative products (Kochhar & David, 16) and 
services (Goes & Park, 17), as well as related in-
puts, such as patent activity (Oldham & Cummings, 
16), R&D intensity (Deutsch, 2007) and R&D 
outputs (David, Hitt, & Gimeno, 2001). 
Furthermore, qualitative (Shaw et al., 2002) and fi-
nancial performance attributable to innovation 
(Jansen et al., 2006) were also included.
data ColleCtion
We searched the academic literature in leading out-
lets at the intersection of innovation and organiza-
tions. We began by consulting the Financial Times’s 
(FT) list of top academic publications, selecting all 
the outlets the FT highlights in the areas of eco-
nomics, general management, human resources 
management and organizational behavior. We also 
included Administrative Science Quarterly from the 
FT’s list of “other” publications due to its coverage 
of management and organization. In addition to 
the 17 journals identified from the FT’s list, we 
sought to ensure inclusion of outlets specializing in 
innovation. So we searched the Ebsco, ScienceDirect, 
Emerald and Ingenta databases looking for any 
peer-reviewed journal that returned at least 30 arti-
cles with the keyword “innovation.” That search 
yielded an additional 17 outlets. In those journals 
we searched every article from 10 to 200 with a 
minimum of eight keywords for each of our con-
structs of interest: a) autonomy, b) rewards, c) 
ownership, d) support, and e) innovation. We then 
filtered each article to determine whether it mea-
sures some aspect of innovation, and at least one 
independent variable in our model. 
We then used the studies identified from this 
initial search to initiate a snowball search process. 
We searched the reference list in each study we se-
lected with the purpose of adding studies from 
journals not included in our initial search, and of 
potentially adding whole journals to our search set. 
Our process for this aspect of the data collection 
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involved reading the abstracts of each of the items 
in the reference list of a previously selected study. 
Articles with relevant abstracts were subject to the 
same initial criteria we used to select studies from 
our initial 34 journals. If the study met the filter 
criteria, it was included in the potential data set. 
Our final sample frame extended to 4 academic 
journals. From those journals, we extracted a data 
set that included 423 observations from within 75 
unique studies, representing a total of 16,605 
firms.
analySeS
After correcting the raw data for measurement 
error, we proceeded to analyze it, using meta-analy-
sis (Hunter & Schmidt, 10) to compute a mean 
correlation for each relationship between an ele-
ment of a hybrid organization, and innovation, 
weighting each study according to sample size and 
employing a fixed effects model (Stahl & Voigt, 
2008). The results indicated that Support has the 
strongest mean correlation (0.36) with Innovation, 
followed by Autonomy (0.30) and Rewards (0.22). 
As we had expected from our review of the litera-
ture, Ownership demonstrated a split result, 
whereby External Ownership demonstrated a posi-
tive correlation (0.05) with Innovation, whereas 
Internal Ownership demonstrated a negative cor-
relation (-0.0) with Innovation. The relationships 
are depicted in Figure 1, with the mean correlations 
indicated on the paths between model variables.
In order to examine contingency relationships 
in our model, we used linear regression to test for 
moderating effects of both firm size and the hybrid 
organizational design element of Support. In order 
to examine the impact of firm size in our analyses, 
we coded the sample within each study as either 
representing large firms (500 or more employees) 
or small firms (fewer than 500 employees) (SBA, 
2010; Beck et al., 2005; Rosenbusch et al., 2011), 
using a binary variable. If the study did not ade-
quately describe the sample, or if the sample in-
cluded firms of mixed size, that study was excluded 
from the analysis of firm size moderation. As a re-
sult, 16 of the 75 studies in our data set were ex-
cluded from this particular analysis.
We began our regression analyses with a base-
line model composed of only the main effect ele-
ments of hybrid organizations. Because performing 
regression with meta-analytic data requires that in-
dependent variables be coded as binaries and re-
gressed against the effect size, the coefficients re-
ported represent differences compared with the 
excluded baseline variable of Internal Ownership. 
This, and the fact that regression distributes vari-
ance across many variables instead of analyzing 
only pairwize correlations, accounts for the differ-
ence in the coefficients between Figure 1 and those 
presented in Table 1. And while most of the main 
effect relationships remain relatively stable in re-
FIGURE 1: Model of Hybrid Organization Elements and Relationship with Innovation
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FIGURE 1 
Model of Hybrid Organization Elements and Relationship with Innovation 
gression, compared with main effect correlations 
calculated using the meta-analysis process and pre-
sented in Figure 1, we highlight one difference of 
interest. The coefficient for Rewards is proportion-
ally larger in regression than in pairwize mean cor-
relation analyses. This may indicate that Rewards is 
reasonably independent of the other variables in 
the model, operating more directly with innovation 
and less correlated with the other independent 
variables associated with hybrid organizational 
designs. 
In the second step of our model, we included 
the binary variable of firm size. Since small firms 
were coded as “0” and larger firms as “1,” a negative 
and significant coefficient for the firm size interac-
tion term indicates that the elements of hybrid or-
ganizational design are less strongly connected with 
innovation in small firms than in large firms. It is 
possible to imagine that smaller firms engender 
more organic innovation and thus do not necessi-
tate hybrid organizational design elements in the 
same way as larger firms do in order to generate in-
novation. We take up this point in our discussion. 
In the third step of our model, we test the moderat-
ing impact of organizational support. From our re-
view of the literature, Support was identified as a 
variable that might strengthen or weaken the rela-
tionship between the other aspects of hybrid orga-
nizational design, and our results offer support for 
this idea, another element we take up in the 
discussion.
diSCuSSion
Despite considerable research on organization de-
sign across various management literatures, ques-
tions regarding the connection with innovation 
have remained. In this paper, we aggregate 20 years’ 
worth of data from academic research which per-
mits us to speak to a number of current issues in 
the design of organizations for increased innovation. 

















(Constant) -0.089 ** 0.034 0.113 * 0.055 0.134 ** 0.051
Autonomy binarya 0.303 *** 0.050 0.200 *** 0.051 0.189 *** 0.047
Support binarya 0.447 *** 0.048 0.397 *** 0.045 0.210 ** 0.062
Rewards binarya 0.469 *** 0.048 0.418 *** 0.046 0.413 *** 0.042
External Ownership 
binarya
0.141 ** 0.047 0.135 ** 0.043 0.135 ** 0.039




Adjusted R2 0.577 *** 0.646 *** 0.698 ***
Adjusted R2 
Change (F)
0.070 (19.736)*** 0.052 (17.191) ***
a As the hybrid organization element variables are coded as binaries, Internal Ownership is excluded as the baseline variable against 
other hybrid organization element variables. 
+ p < .10 * p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p< 0.001
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The pace of change in modern economies is so evi-
dent that any theory of organizational design ought 
to be able to help explain the rate of innovation in 
advanced capitalist societies. Our empirical exami-
nation of the linkages between hybrids and innova-
tion using a meta-analysis of existing data is an ef-
fective research strategy for testing the framework 
because it leverages the richness of research on or-
ganizational innovation. Our results show that 
movements in a more market-like direction (greater 
autonomy for employees, more market-like re-
wards, more external market ownership) are 
strongly related to innovation in organizations.
Dimensions of autonomy
Our results show a meaningful mean effect size be-
tween autonomy and innovation. Recent work has 
suggested that autonomy is a multidimensional 
construct (Sadler-Smith et al., 2003; Lumpkin, 
Cogliser, & Schneider, 200). It would be helpful to 
have a more precise understanding of exactly which 
aspects of autonomy are most related to innovation 
performance. Autonomy has been classically mani-
fest in employee empowerment in manufacturing 
operations such as Toyota’s lean production system. 
But we also observe that discretion in terms of sig-
nificant blocks of time appears to be an important 
aspect of autonomy at Google, where employees are 
granted 20% of the workweek to explore new ideas. 
In other environments, however, the relevant aspect 
of discretion may lie with either financial resources 
or tangible resources, such as the warehouse of eas-
ily scavengeable spare parts that Thomas Edison 
used to assemble innovations like the phonograph 
and the telephone. 
Distribution of Rewards
Similarly, more specificity is needed on exactly 
which aspects of rewards are specifically related to 
particular aspects of innovative behavior, and what 
the trade-offs are in administering these rewards 
(Hayton, 2005: 37–38). For example, Lee et al. 
(2004) show that evaluation pressure may offset the 
incentives for innovative behavior. Practical re-
search into innovation using an exercise termed 
“the Marshmallow Challenge” (Wujek, 2010) has 
shown that high-stakes rewards have a strong and 
negative relationship with innovation among un-
skilled or unpracticed individuals, and that high-
stakes rewards are only connected with innovation 
when individuals have the skills necessary for the 
task.
Ownership
Finally, our analysis shows that despite the percep-
tion among both practitioners and some academics 
that “bringing the market inside the firm” involves 
“making employees feel like owners” (Baker, 
Gibbons, & Murphy, 2001: 212) the reality is that 
internal ownership is negatively correlated with in-
novation, whereas external ownership is positively 
correlated with it. Perhaps, to look again at Baker et 
al.’s words quoted above, the operative words for 
organizations seeking to encourage innovation are 
to make employees feel like owners (by the judi-
cious use of rewards and by simulating the self-em-
ployment experience by offering significant auton-
omy in the workplace), without actually making 
them owners. Viewed from the perspective of our 
analyses, we are not satisfied with the completeness 
of the ownership literature as it relates to innova-
tion. While we were able to include sufficient stud-
ies investigating the connection, we note with an 
eye toward future investigation that a wider range 
of ownership variables need to be considered and 
even compared for a more complete analysis, such 
as public ownership, family ownership, entrepre-
neur-owned ventures, and angel and venture capi-
tal-backed firms.
Benefits of Smallness
The paradox of firm size is relentless. It is the great 
aspiration of small innovative firms to become 
large. And it is the great aspiration of large firms to 
become as innovative as they were when they were 
small. Our results offer two inputs. The first is that 
innovation in small firms appears to have less to do 
with hybrid organizational design elements than it 
does in larger firms. This may be a reflection of the 
phenomenon that W. L. Gore observed 50 years 
ago, and that has driven organization design within 
his highly successful firm ever since. His observa-
tion is that human beings face a natural cognitive 
limitation in terms of the number of people they 
can interact informally with. For Gore, that number 
was 150. Organizations with fewer than 150 em-
ployees behaved like cohesive informal teams. 
Organizations with more than 150 employees be-
haved like formal bureaucracies. Gore’s solution to 
this observation, too radical for many organiza-
tions, was to physically split any group in the Gore 
organization when that group exceeded 150 people. 
The result has created a firm composed of dozens of 
independent business units, all fewer than 150 peo-
ple, composing an overall firm that has been con-
sistently profitable and identified as one of the “Best 
Places to Work” for many years. And while we can-
not explore Gore’s hypothesis with our data (we 
operationalize firm size from study design so have 
limited granularity) we also recognize that the firm 
has limited success exploiting “big” opportunities 
that require scale beyond the limits of the business 
unit1) (Sathe, 2003). This issue suggests caution for 
practitioners and future possibilities for research-
ers. The second input offers clear encouragement 
for larger firms – that firms which choose to opti-
mize for innovation do have functional organiza-
tional levers at their disposal for encouraging such 
activity. Those levers may come with unintended 
consequences that we do not measure or even 
imagine here, but they at least point to possible 
paths of action.
Need for Support
We are fascinated by both the strength of the main 
effect relationship between support and innovation, 
and the strength of the moderating impact of sup-
port on autonomy and rewards. The implications of 
these findings suggest that levers organizations 
wish to employ to encourage innovation be accom-
panied by organizational support. Organizations 
can offer employees the time, resources and rewards 
to innovate, but if those employees feel that the or-
ganization will not support their efforts or manage 
their failures, they will be less likely to engage in in-
novative activity. As with the other elements of hy-
brid organizational design, there appears to be a 
wide range of ways organizational support can 
manifest. We view this as both a research opportu-
nity and a practical opportunity. From a research 
perspective, finding a setting and a method that en-
ables comparison of some of the wide variety of or-
ganizational support implementations would rep-
resent a valuable contribution. And for organization 
designers in firms both large and small (though 
perhaps more so for large firms, per our comments 
above), there exists a broad palette of alternative 
actions for providing organizational support for 
innovators. 
Change over Time
A final point we mention is that meta-analytic re-
search results do change over time and are therefore 
perishable. We compare, for example, the result we 
report on the autonomy-innovation relationship 
with the results reported for centralization-innova-
tion by Damanpour (11) and for mechanistic or-
ganizational design by Calantone, Harmancioglu, 
and Droge (2010). This comparison of results shows 
that the effect size of autonomy-innovation is 
meaningfully larger in our analyses, which include 
only studies from 10 to 200, compared to those 
used by Damanpour (167–188) or Calantone et 
al. (176–2006). And while we present this only as 
observation, we do speculate that the accelerated 
pace of globalization, competition and technology 
may explain why organizations see a stronger rela-
tionship between autonomy and innovation when 
only more recent studies are sampled. 
Limitations
Meta-analyses are only as good as the studies on 
which the analysis is based and therefore share limi-
tations inherent to underlying sources. A case in 
point in the present study is organizational design 
choices which are potentially endogenous to a 
broader set of strategic choices the organization 
makes. However, this endogeneity issue is hardly 
ever controlled for in the underlying studies we 
meta-analyzed, and therefore this concern cannot 
be eliminated in our meta-analysis. Therefore, 
when individual studies included in the analysis 
contain limitations, or if the entire set of studies re-
flects a general publication bias, the meta-analysis 
will likewise contain these limitations. Further, 
many studies published in the literature do not 
contain the data necessary to include them in meta-
analysis, a common complaint of meta-analysis au-
thors (Read, Song, & Smit, 200). We identified nu-
merous studies of interest that did not include key 
statistics, such as correlation tables. A further limi-
tation of the method is granularity. While 
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meta-analysis offers extraordinary power to bring a 
large body of diverse extant work to a research 
question, it does not afford insight into detailed 
sub-questions within the data, such as whether 
young people and older people respond differently 
to rewards. There are many nuanced elements in 
the governance thesis which might profitably be 
explored using alternative methods.
Conclusions
Despite certain limitations, the findings we present 
in this paper offer several useful contributions to 
both researchers and senior managers. We have 
shown that there is room for researchers to consider 
a more cohesive theory and practice of organiza-
tional design as it relates to innovation. Not only do 
we find direct relationships between autonomy, re-
wards and ownership and innovation but our mod-
eration model also indicates that these effects are 
sensitive to organizational support for innovation. 
This means that in the domain of innovation, the 
configuration of organizational factors to effect in-
novation proclivity continues to represent a prom-
ising research agenda for organizational researchers 
and actionable levers for organizational designers.
note
1) We would like to recognize the contribution of 
an anonymous reviewer in raising this point.
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